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 Body cultivation practices known as qigong1 were the most widespread form of 
popular religiosity in post-Mao urban China between 1979 and 19992. It is estimated that 
at the height of “qigong fever” in the middle of this period, over 100 million people --  
over 20% of the urban population --  practiced the gymnastic, breathing and meditative 
exercises of qigong  in some form or another. Hundreds of charismatic qigong healers and 
masters rose to fame and built organisations which, in the two cases of Zhonggong and 
Falungong, could claim as many or more adherents as the 40-million-strong Chinese 
Communist Party (CCP) – the largest mass organizations independent of government 
control in China. Falungong has become well known in the West since April 25, 1999, 
when it staged a 10,000-person protest around the CCP headquarters. This was followed 
by a harsh state repression campaign against Falungong, which has also led to the 
dismantling of most other qigong groups.  
 Media images of Falungong repression and resistance should not, however, blind 
us to the complex reality of the qigong movement in the Peoples’ Republic. For much of 
the post-Mao period, government support played an instrumental role in the spread of 
the qigong craze. Qigong was touted as a cheap and powerful healing technology, as a 
“somatic science” that could lead to revolutionary discoveries for harnessing the powers 
of the human mind, and as a secularized training system that contained the key to the 
mysteries of traditional Chinese wisdom without the dross of religion or superstition. 
And yet, while these modernizing discourses lent legitimacy to qigong, practitioners 
plunged into the legends and symbols of Buddhist magicians and Taoist immortals, 
dabbled in talismans and divination, and often experienced, through trance states, visions 
of popular demons and deities.  
                                                
1 Pronounced “ch’ee-gong” 
2 For a detailed account of the subject matter of this chapter, and for references to Chinese sources, see 
Palmer 2002 or Palmer forthcoming.  
 The indeterminacy of qigong, as a type of body practice that allows one to pass in 
a breath from physical fitness exercises to mystic visualisations or apocalyptic militancy, 
opened a space for the massive spread of a body-centred religiosity under the cover of 
health, sports, and science, outside the supervision of the official Bureau of religious 
affairs. And yet, the enthusiasm of Party leaders for qigong in the 1980’s, followed by their 
fear of Falungong and other qigong groups today, suggests that body cultivation can come 
dangerously close to the religious roots of Chinese political power and legitimacy.  
 In this chapter, I will begin with a brief overview of body cultivation in 
traditional China, followed by an account of the changing configurations of body 
cultivation in mainland Chinese society after 1949. I will attempt to show that while body 
cultivation was a fundamental aspect of traditional Chinese religion, it was also ideally 
suited for adaptation to the organization of modern life centred on the individual body. 
As such, qigong became a remarkably modern form of reappropriation and transformation 
of Chinese religious tradition.  
 
 Body cultivation in traditional China 
 
 Chinese notions of the body make no dichotomies between the mind and the 
flesh. By “body cultivation” I refer to Chinese traditions of training the body/mind to 
conform with the pattern and power flows of the cosmos. The greater the body’s 
correspondence with the cosmos, the more it taps into cosmic powers that can flow 
through the body, towards other bodies and into the world. Body cultivation involves 
sets of movements and forms which aim for the attainment of specific goals, and are 
transmitted through a training process which forms the basis of a tradition. It is an 
individual practice that usually involves the self-disciplined control of diet, posture, 
breathing, and thoughts. It is also a social practice, in which techniques and interpretive 
frameworks are transmitted from a master to disciples, and in which the powers gained 
from practice are used for a variety of ends within specific social and historical contexts.  
 Throughout history, Chinese body cultivation has involved a diversity of 
techniques, which have been transmitted in different social settings, and have been used 
for various purposes within different cosmologies. The dances and ecstatic healing 
practices of ancient Chinese shamanism were probably the source of later traditions of 
body cultivation. Invisible forces represented as demons and winds were later 
reconceptualized as cosmic breath (qi)3. During the warring states period (475-221 BC), 
gymnastics and breath training were practiced as forms of health cultivation, and were 
described in philosophical works, notably the Laozi and Zhuangzi, as means of attaining 
unity with the Dao. Other texts mentioned body cultivation among the techniques for 
attaining immortality. In classical China, the proper training of the body through fasting 
and meditation was a prerequisite to self-cultivation and participation in rituals, which, to 
Confucius, aimed to foster social cohesion through the harmonious movement of 
bodies. The emperor’s body was seen as the centre of the ordering of the cosmos: the 
appropriate movements of his body through the space of the realm and following the 
cycles of the seasons, were essential to preserving the cosmic order. The empire was seen 
as an extension of the emperor’s body: the disorderly conduct of the emperor would 
cause chaos in the realm; natural disasters and calamities were seen as signs of the moral 
degeneracy of the emperor’s body. The correspondence between the body of the 
emperor and the body politic was formalized in the medical theories of the Han dynasty, 
which applied the principles of government to the flows of qi in the body: the same 
Chinese word zhi refers to healing and government.  
 From the 1st century onward, Daoism developed a rich repertoire of body 
cultivation practices, ranging from the meditations on oneness of the Heavenly Masters 
movement to the Shangqing and Lingbao sects’ visualizations of the divine landscape of 
the inner body. The inner alchemy tradition sought to refine the elixir of immortality 
through the manipulation and combination of cosmic energies in the body. Body 
cultivation was also practiced by Taoist priests as a key to the mastery and efficacy of 
rituals conducted for local families and communities 4 . Buddhism introduced yogic 
meditation from India, practiced as a means of nurturing awareness of ultimate reality 
and, in the case of tantrism, of nurturing and controlling divine powers. The Shaolin and 
Wudang traditions of martial arts developed the use of body cultivation as the 
foundation of techniques of combat.  
 By the Song dynasty, body cultivation had become widespread in many segments 
of society. Meditation by “sitting in tranquillity” became a popular practise of Confucian 
literati, while sectarian groups disseminated body cultivation techniques among the 
common people. These groups, which often espoused apocalyptic beliefs and delivered a 
message of salvation, commonly used the transmission of body techniques – including 
                                                
3 See Unschuld 1985: 29-50.  
4 On Taoist body cultivation, see Schipper 1993.  
mantra recitation, breath control, sitting meditation, healing techniques, and martial arts -
- as a method of recruitment and expansion. Practice of the techniques could reinforce 
sectarian identity; the body became a vehicle for the nurturing and transmission of 
eschatological beliefs. Martial arts became more important in the sectarian repertoire in 
the 19th century, as increasing social chaos and banditry led to the multiplication of 
community self-defence groups. In the Boxer rebellion of 1899-1900, certain forms of 
martial arts were believed to confer invincibility against Western military technology5.  
 By the early 20th century, body cultivation was practiced among common people 
and among the elites, and diffused in a wide variety of contexts – it was even a 
fundamental part of training for the Chinese opera and acrobatic performance, which are 
closely related to the martial arts. The techniques varied greatly, but in most cases 
involved breath training as a basic foundation. They were usually steeped in religious 
symbolism, and transmitted secretly from master to disciple: mastering the arts of body 
cultivation was part of being initiated into an esoteric tradition. The process of initiation 
could last many years, as in the case of the Taoist priesthood, or could take only 
moments, as in some sectarian movements which taught a secret mantra as a sign of 
membership. But in all cases, body cultivation was never an end in itself: it was always 
but one element of other social practices and conceptual systems: religion, government, 
medicine, mysticism, ritual, monasticism, defence, sectarian salvation, etc. There was no 
single category to encompass the various forms of what I here call “body cultivation”, 
much less a self-conscious community or network of practitioners who could recognize 
each other in their common practice of these techniques.  
 The status of body cultivation began to change in the first half of the 20th 
century, with the introduction of Western values and the construction of a modern state. 
The new institutions privileged a mechanical, disembodied ordering of the world: body 
cultivation was irrelevant to the ends of the modern bureaucracies, armies, and schools 
that mediated knowledge and power in the emerging society. And yet, body cultivation 
could find a niche within new social structures that atomized the individual body and 
privileged material technologies leading to rational ends. Marginalized, body cultivation 
techniques became visible, and could be conceptualised as a distinct category that would 
recast them either as a modern technology for the mass development of healthy bodies, 
or as a vehicle for a nationalist or mystical resistance to an alienating modernity, or, as 
would happen in the qigong boom of the 1980’s, both at the same time.   
                                                
5 See Esherick 1987: 50-53, and Cohen 1997: 16-30, 99-118.  
 Such a process began during the Republican era (1911 – 1949), when some 
authors popularised sitting meditation and other practices through widely circulated 
books that sought to eliminate the obscure esoteric language in which the techniques had 
traditionally been couched, and to present them in the idioms of psychology, physiology, 
and physics6. But it was under the Communist regime that body cultivation became the 
subject of a distinct category as part of a larger project of state expansion.  
 
The birth of qigong  
 
 During the Chinese civil and anti-Japanese wars (1927-1949), Red Army and 
Communist Party units, retrenched in remote “Liberated Areas” and lacking access to 
modern medical facilities, encouraged the use of traditional local remedies for the care of 
injured and ill soldiers and officials. In was under such conditions that cadre Liu 
Guizhen, who had been suffering from ulcers and insomnia, obtained leave in 1947 to 
return to his native village in present-day Hebei province. While recuperating there, his 
uncle taught him a form of breathing exercise which, after 102 days of practice, cured 
him of his ailments. Upon returning to his work post, he enthusiastically reported on the 
method’s efficiency to his Party superiors, who charged him with experimenting with 
clinical applications of the method. Together with some colleagues, he researched 
classical medical texts on body cultivation, taught the techniques to other patients, and 
finally standardized two forms of exercise. The research group chose the term “qigong 
therapy” to designate the exercises.  
The term qigong, though it had appeared as early as the Tang dynasty (618-907), 
had rarely been used in the past, and did not have the meaning of “breath training” 
intended by Liu Guizhen7. Qigong was promoted as a new category to encompass all body 
cultivation techniques that involved the training, control and circulation of qi or “vital 
breath” in combination with body and mental discipline. Provincial Party leaders 
supported his work and called on him to found a qigong clinic in the city of Tangshan in 
1953, followed two years later by the foundation of a qigong sanatorium in the exclusive 
seaside resort of Beidaihe, a favourite retreat for the Party elite. Liu Guizhen was 
honoured by Vice-President Liu Shaoqi and treated several of the country’s top leaders. 
Qigong was recognized as a discipline of Chinese medicine, alongside herbalism, 
                                                
6 See Kohn 2002.  
7 On the etymology of the term qigong, see Despeux 1997: 267.  
acupuncture, and massage, and national qigong worshops were held to train clinicians 
from hospitals and medical units from around China.  
Benefiting from such high-level political support, qigong quickly spread within 
medical institutions. Seventy qigong units were founded by the end of the 1950s. A 
national conference on qigong was held in 1959 and a national qigong training course was 
organized a year later. Books were published on the subject and several research units 
began clinical and laboratory trials on the physiological effects of qigong. Over 300 
scientific articles on qigong had been published in Chinese journals by the early 1960s. 
Thus institutionalised and modernized, qigong, together with the other disciplines 
of Chinese medicine, could be marshalled to serve the health policy needs of the new 
state. Indeed, after decades of civil war, the country’s medical system was in ruins by the 
end of the 1940’s. The answer was to enlist the hundreds of thousands of traditional 
doctors -- whose practices had been suppressed by the previous Nationalist regime -- to 
the cause of improving the health of the Chinese masses. They were assigned to state 
medical work units and educated in scientific methodologies8.  
At the same time, the practitioners of Western medicine, trained abroad or in 
missionary colleges, were tainted by their association with imperialist bourgeois culture, 
and accused of trying to place their scientific practice above political supervision. The 
institutions of Chinese medicine, on the other hand, as creations of the Communist state, 
were more docile and grateful to the Party authorities. With the growing rift between 
Maoist China and the Soviet Union, Chinese medicine further benefited from an 
increasing nationalism and appreciation of native civilization.  
Modern qigong was designed to serve the needs of the new medical institutions of 
the Peoples’ Republic: with qigong, body cultivation became an instrument of state power. 
Useful therapeutic techniques were secularised and extracted from their traditional social 
and symbolic settings: master-disciple lineages were replaced by cohorts of “medical 
workers” operating in institutional settings. Secret transmission was replaced by formal 
training courses and the publication of therapeutic methods in medical journals. Instead 
of becoming the source of esoteric knowledge, practitioners’ bodies were used as 
subjects for clinical research based on biomedical categories. The effects of practice were 
described in physical and chemical terms, and concepts of yin-yang and qi  were 
standardized and materialized as expressions of “primitive dialectics” compatible with 
Marxist philosophy. 
                                                
8 On the institutionalisation of Chinese medicine, see Croizier 1968.  
For reasons both practical and ideological, body cultivation thus flourished as a 
branch of institutionalised Chinese medicine in the 1950’s. Entirely an instrument of  
state modernization and political campaigns, qigong during this period did not develop the 
alternative social networks and ideologies that would emerge in the 1980’s. But it did 
acquire legitimacy and a niche within the state system, from which it could expand as a 
mass movement in the 1980s.  
 
Mass qigong  
 
 Together with almost everything associated with traditional culture, qigong was 
attacked as a “feudal superstition” during the Cultural revolution (1964-1976), and it 
medical institutions were closed. There were no officially sanctioned qigong activities in 
China from 1965 until its rehabilitation in 1978. However, one woman, Guo Lin, an 
artist and cancer victim from Guangdong province who had cured herself by practicing 
qigong during the1960s, was brave enough to teach qigong to other cancer victims  in the 
parks of Beijing as early as 1970. Although she was often harassed by the police, the 
number of people who came to practice qigong with her grew, until she was able to train 
coaches to lead practice groups in other parks, and an informal organization of 
practitioners was created to study and publicize her method. In 1977, she submitted a 
report to the health ministry which, summarizing seven years of experience teaching 
qigong, claimed that qigong was a cure for cancer. Her method, which advocated training 
the mind and body for the “ideological struggle against cancer”, was published as the 
New Qigong Therapy and, at the end of the Cultural revolution, Guo Lin was invited to 
lecture in dozens of universities, factories and official units. Thousands began to learn 
her qigong method in parks and public spaces around the country.  
 Guo Lin inaugurated a new form of qigong, heavily marked by the mass culture of 
the cultural revolution: qigong was no longer confined to the medical institutions of the 
Party elite, but became a grassroots popular movement. Instead of professional medical 
workers providing one-on-one clinical instruction, amateur enthusiasts led free collective 
practice sessions in public spaces. The standardized set of exercises in Guo Lin’s book 
could be learned by anyone and was replicable anywhere. Guo Lin became something of 
a celebrity. Her ‘New Qigong Therapy’ quickly spread to most cities in China and even to 
several Western countries. Other qigong methods were also popularized and spread to all 
parts of China within less than a year.  By the end of the 1970’s, it was not rare to see 
more than a dozen different qigong methods being practiced in the same park on a given 
morning.  
   
Ecstatic and charismatic qigong  
 
Among the qigong methods which appeared in 1980, one of the most popular was 
“Great Crane qigong”, which signalled the appearance of religious and charismatic motifs 
in qigong practice. This method was propagated by Yang Meijun, a 77-year old woman 
who had been trained by her grandfather into a Taoist tradition in which one imitates the 
movements of the great crane, a symbol of immortality. Yang had participated in the 
anti-Japanese guerrilla and had lived in the Communist Party base of Yan’an before the 
establishment of the Peoples’ Republic, then had concealed her knowledge of body 
cultivation until the end of the Cultural Revolution. Her Great Crane Qigong was the first 
method to explicitly claim a Taoist heritage rather than an affiliation with modernized 
Chinese medicine. After Liu Guizhen, the cadre and communist clinician, and Guo Lin, 
the intrepid self-taught anti-cancer combatant, Yang Meijun emerged as the venerable 
inheritor of a secret lineage and as the possessor of concealed magical powers. Besides 
teaching her gymnastic exercices, she used her powers to treat the ill by projecting her qi 
onto patients. Qigong was no longer exclusively a self-training exercise: by receiving the 
mysterious qi emitted by the master, patients entered into a new type of relationship with 
her and with the powerful traditions she was perceived to embody.  
 Two other immensely successful qigong methods to be launched around that time 
-- “Flying Crane Qigong” and the “Qigong of the Spontaneous Movements of the Five 
Animals” – triggered states of  “spontaneous movements qigong”. In these methods, after 
entering a state of deep relaxation through body and breathing exercises, the practitioner 
falls into a trance which lasts between thirty minutes and two hours, during which he hits 
or massages himself, spontaneously carries out kung fu, taijiquan, or dance movements, 
or even falls and rolls on the ground. In this type of qigong, visions of gods or aliens were 
frequent. Large numbers of people in such trance states became a common sight in 
parks.  
 Another widespread phenomenon during the qigong wave was glossolalia or 
“cosmic language”, a condition analogous to “speaking in tongues”. The most notorious 
promoter of this practice was Zhang Xiangyu, an actress who claimed to have been 
pushed by a puff of qi to run without stopping for days and nights on end, and who then 
played host in her kitchen to the Jade Emperor, the Queen Mother, Guanyin, Sakyamuni, 
the Venerable Lord Lao, and other popular divinities. She heard a voice in “cosmic 
language” tell her to save humanity by teaching the Qigong of the Centre of Nature to the 
people, a method which attracted tens of thousands of devotees.  
The spread of ecstatic qigong occurred in a context in which Deng Xiaoping’s 
policy of reforms and opening up had created the conditions for a religious revival in the 
1980’s. In the countryside, this revival manifested itself through the rebuilding of temples 
destroyed during the Cultural revolution and through the reconstitution of ritual 
networks. In the cities, however, the renewed interest in religion was more diffuse: books 
on religious subjects found a large readership, and television serials on religious themes 
such as the Journey to the West were smash hits.  “Martial arts fever” added to the spiritual 
ferment. Kung fu novels and films from Hong Kong and Taiwan flooded mainland 
theatres and bookstalls, fuelling the growth of a burgeoning martial arts subculture. 
Itinerant martial arts troupes resurfaced and entertained crowds with their exploits. 
Blockbuster movies such as Shaolin Temple triggered a cult following among youth, who 
flocked to the temples of Shaolin, Wudang and Emei in search of the secret teachings of 
a master.  
 These films and novels depict Buddhist monks and Taoist masters who can fly, 
disappear and reappear, and read peoples’ minds – abilities they are said to have acquired 
through the mastery of “inner cultivation” (neigong), which involves the body, breath and 
mind control exercises associated with qigong. For thousands of kungfu fans, the magical 
feats of the past and the stunts of pulp films were not fiction: they could be mastered 
through initiation by a master.  
 A legend grew around the most famous qigong masters, many of whom were said 
to have demonstrated miraculous powers from their early childhood in a poor 
countryside surrounded by mountains, grottoes and temples. Typically, they received 
initiation from as early as four years old from a succession of mysterious sages, monks, 
and masters representing all the esoteric traditions of Taoism, Buddhism, Confucianism, 
Chinese medicine and martial arts. Such an initiation is said to be the result of karmic 
predisposition (yuanfen) – the qigong master is one of the elect of the initiates, who 
possesses extraordinary power over the forces of the universe. After a period of 
incubation, during which the young master conceals his abilities, his initiators command 
him to “go out of the mountains” (chushan) – to manifest his powers and his knowledge 
to the public, in order to deliver the world from its agony.  
Ecstatic qigong has been interpreted as a popular cathartic vehicle for the release 
of pent-up emotions after the torment of the Cultural Revolution9. Qigong also offered 
the possibility for the private appropriation of public spaces in the socialist republic10. 
Indeed, ecstatic and charismatic qigong went beyond the earlier categorization of qigong as 
a therapeutic technique. After having been engulfed in a collective fusion with Mao 
Zedong during the Cultural Revolution, people could, by practicing qigong, rediscover 
their own bodies and subjectivities. Through exploring the inner universe of the body 
and directing the circulation of its energies, entering mystical realms through trances and 
visions, and connecting oneself, through a master, to ancient esoteric traditions, 
practitioners could enter an alternate world from the monotonous, regimented life of the 
socialist danwei (work unit) and its totalitarian, industrial-bureaucratic organization of 
bodies. The danwei was a walled compound, in which work, leisure, housing and family 
life were contained and managed by a cadre of danwei officials, the lingdao, who were in 
perpetual internecine struggle for the control of state resources and prestige. Work was 
rarely challenging or rewarding, and often idle, as unit members subtly resisted arbitrary 
authority through enjoying the lifetime job security of the “iron rice bowl” by putting in 
as little effort as possible. Information was mediated by a propaganda apparatus that 
impressed itself on the mind several times each day through the blaring of the Peoples’ 
Radio on loudspeakers. For those who weren’t politically ambitious, the danwei offered 
no hope for personal development or advancement, little contact with the outside world, 
and little space for personal subjectivity. In the cracked concrete yards of housing 
compounds and between the scraggly bushes of urban parks, however, practicing qigong 
could open endless new horizons of experience and knowledge. Here, the body became a 
receptacle and a conduit of traditional wisdom and mystical symbols. Hitherto unknown 
forms of energy inside and outside the body could be experienced, monitored, directed, 
and emitted, leading to a sense of better health and, often literally, of heightened power. 
Qigong offered a way of personally appropriating and embodying this new world of 
knowledge, power, and experience – an alternative to the alienating world of the danwei, 
one which could be legitimately and openly pursued under the guise of physical fitness11.  
 
                                                
9 Ots 1994 
10 Chen 1995.  
11 For other interpretations of the qigong boom, see Penny 1993: 179; Ots 1994: 126; Micollier 1999; 
Chen 1995: 361; Zhu and Penny 1994: 7; Zhu 1994 [1989]; Hsu 1999: 24; Heise 1999: 110; Xu 1999; 
Chen 2003.  
Qigong  science 
 
The experimentation of inner states through body techniques could also be 
conceived of as doing science. The inner body became an instrument for observing the 
cosmos. Contrary to institutionalised science, in which a small number of specialists 
produce knowledge for passive consumption by everyone else, this was a type of 
scientific activity that anyone could engage in. Thousands of amateur scholars devoted 
themselves to studying classical texts on body cultivation and trying out different 
methods, exchanging observations and commentary in popular qigong journals. This was a 
conscious project of engaging in the prestigious activity of scientific research. Here, the 
body became the laboratory. A scientific attitude was seen as necessary to save body 
cultivation from centuries of superstitious dross, but to enable qigong to create a new type 
of science: “science will save qigong and qigong will save science”. Here, scientism was not 
an abstract ideology, but an embodied practice.  
As a source of knowledge, qigong also fascinated the Chinese scientific community 
itself. By the end of the 1970’s a handful of scientists began to conduct experiments on 
‘external Qi’, the energy which is said to be sent by qigong masters toward their patients. 
Dr. Feng Lida began research at the National Navy Hospital, and Gu Hansen of the 
China Academy of Sciences Nuclear Research Centre announced that he had discovered 
the material basis of the “external qi” said to be emitted by qigong masters.  
 Meanwhile, the strange phenomenon of children reading with their ears made a 
sensation in the mass media. After the first case of such a child in Dazu county, Sichuan, 
was covered by an official newspaper, similar phenomena were reported all over the 
country. Researchers from Beijing University published an article in Ziran, a popular 
science magazine, claiming that they had trained 60% of a sample of children to read 
without their eyes. The magazine subsequently published a series of articles on similar 
paranormal phenomena, stimulating widespread debate and speculation on what were 
called “extraordinary functions of the human body”. On May 5 1979, however, the 
Peoples’ Daily denounced ‘extroardinary functions’ as quackery, anti-science and idealism, 
leading the media to momentarily cease publishing reports of such phenomena.   
 In spite of controversy, interest in ‘extraordinary functions’ of the human body 
did not diminish. Researchers from several universities gathered in Shanghai in January 
1981 to share their findings and discuss how to counter charges of idealism and pseudo-
science. Extraordinary Functions research groups were formed in several scientific 
institutions. A few months later, a second academic conference led to the foundation of 
the China Human Body Science Research Society, dedicated to research on 
Extraordinary Functions. Some persons with alleged extraordinary functions, such as 
Zhang Baosheng, became media celebrities. In 1982, scientists from several key 
universities conducted tests on some of these individuals and announced that their 
powers were “proven”. Debate raged in the press. The state propaganda bureau moved 
to put an end to speculation. But China’s most influential scientist, Qian Xuesen, a 
graduate of MIT who was the principal architect of China’s nuclear weapons program, 
successfully intervened before the central leadership on behalf of Extraordinary 
Functions research, which was now officially permitted and legitimised. 
 Meanwhile, researchers were continuing their experiments on qigong. In 1980, the 
Shanghai Chinese Medicine Research Institute announced that it had successfully tested 
‘qigong anesthesia’ by emission of external Qi onto patients undergoing surgery. Qinghua, 
China’s most prestigious university for the physical sciences, also began experiments in 
1980. Scientists began to theorize on the nature of Qi and the effects of qigong. The ability 
to emit external qi appeared as a type of Extraordinary Function which could be trained 
and nurtured through practice. Some qigong masters were also reported to have 
paranormal abilities such as ESP and telekinesis. Qigong increasingly came to be 
conceived as a technique for attaining Extraordinary Functions.  
 Qigong, Extraordinary Functions, and martial arts began to merge in the popular 
imagination. Through assiduous qigong practice, anyone could hope to develop the 
Extraordinary Functions latent in his body. The supernatural feats of ancient Chinese 
popular legends, literature and culture had been proven through real-life experience and 
scientific observation. Qigong became the scientifically tested key to breaking the laws of 
classical physics. The old legends were true, qigong would turn them into science, and 
China would be at the forefront of a new global scientific revolution.  
   
 Qigong  Fever 
 
 In early 1986, the China Qigong Scientific Research Association was founded on a 
triumphant note, as Professor Qian Xuesen proclaimed the new scientific revolution. 
The creation of this academic body was heralded as a turning point in the history of  
science, as qigong advocates cried: “qigong has left religion and folklore to enter the Temple 
of Science!” 
 Official recognition of qigong grew. On the instigation of Zhang Zhenhuan, 
revolutionary hero, retired Red Army General and president of the new association, a 
large gathering of national leaders witnessed master Zhang Baosheng demonstrate his 
Extraordinary Functions at a meeting in Canton in September 1986. Leaders of the 
Commission of Science and Technology for National Defense, which managed the 
country’s huge military-industrial complex, promoted the military applications of qigong – 
it was speculated that qigong masters could use their qi to deflect incoming ballistic 
missiles. One master was employed by the space agency to telepathically detect faults in a 
satellite before launching. Other masters were invited by the geological prospection 
agency to detect underground mineral deposits. The National Sports Commission 
organized qigong training to increase the abilities of Chinese athletes in international 
competitions. The National Education Commission experimented with qigong training in 
primary schools to increase the intelligence of children.  
 Meanwhile, qigong fever was raised to a frenzy by a young and previously 
unknown qigong master, Yan Xin, who claimed to have been initiated since his early 
childhood by over 30 traditional masters of medicine, martial arts, Buddhism, Taoism 
and Confucianism. In early 1987, researchers at Qinghua University publicized results of 
experiments showing that his External Qi had changed the molecular structure of water 
at a distance of 2000 km. Yan Xin became an instant celebrity. He began a series of 
public lectures in large auditoriums and sports stadiums across the country. Entitled 
‘Force-filled Experimental Lectures’, they drew audiences of up to 20,000, lasted up to 
ten hours without interruption, and were the scene of transe reactions and miraculous 
healings. Yan Xin gave over 200 mass healing lectures between 1987 and 1989. Before 
long, other qigong masters began giving Force-filled Lectures, and an industry was 
spawned selling ‘force-filled’ audio and video tapes of Yan Xin’s lectures. The qigong 
grandmaster became a popular idol combing in one body the powers of the ancient 
wizard and of the pioneering scientist.  
 “Qigong Fever” expressed and combined many strands of utopianism in post-Mao 
China. At the level of the individual body, the practice of qigong can produce profound 
sensations and experiences that often lead to a heightened sense of health, empowerment 
and understanding. These changes can produce a radical transformation in one’s 
relationship with one’s body and with the world, and a sense of connection with the 
ultimate power of the cosmos that is absent in the alienated routines of modern 
industrial culture. As a mass movement, qigong multiplied such experiences in millions of 
bodies, whose number grew exponentially, presaging the day when, eventually, all of 
China, and even the whole world, would experience and participate in the transformation 
– a transformation that would lead to universal health, the spread of superhuman and 
paranormal abilities on a wide scale, and the eventual end of disease and suffering.  
 Such fantasies evoked visions of Taoist immortal realms, the Pure Land of  
Buddhism, and the millenarian eschatology of the sectarian tradition. They also revived 
the tradition of utopian consciousness which had been fostered through forty years of 
Communism and Maoism – but one which, after the failure and pain of the Cultural 
Revolution, was turning inwards, into the body, into tending its sufferings, into a mass 
movement which didn’t contest the structure of social relations but spread from body to 
body, dreaming that all would change once each body had been transformed. As such, 
because the effects of qigong could be viscerally felt by the practitioner, soothing and 
curing illness and pain, and providing experiences of power and knowledge, qigong could 
stimulate the enthusiasm of the masses of all social and educational backgrounds. At the 
same time, for intellectuals and scientists, qigong reconciled the scientism of mainstream 
modern Chinese thought with pride in the achievements of Chinese culture. Qigong thus 
legitimised the study of Chinese traditions and held forth the promise of a revolutionary 
Chinese science, one which would restore Chinese civilization and wisdom to its true 
dignity and propel it to the vanguard of world scientific discovery. For Party leaders and 
state officials, many of whom personally experienced the transformation of their bodies 
through practicing qigong themselves or through being treated by qigong masters, qigong 
thus offered the promise of national empowerment vis-à-vis the West, not only through 
creating a healthier, stronger, paranormal race of men, but also through developing a new 
system of knowledge both more advanced than that of the West and unfathomable for 
uninitiated foreigners12. Qian Xuesen and others saw in qigong the key to a renewed and 
reinvigorated Marxism based on the mind-body dialectic. Even after the Tiananmen 
student protests of 1989, which led the Party to become more suspicious of popular 
movements, some of its leaders saw in qigong a form of substitute faith : its exercises and 
mystical flights could distract people from political preoccupations.  
 
                                                
12 Qigong masters often refused to initiate foreigners to higher levels, fearing that they would discover 
the secrets of qigong power, allowing them to eventually surpass the Chinese. Some leaders were also 
concerned that, through paranormal research, Western countries were already becoming more advanced 
in an area in which China had a natural advantage. China risked seeing the West make better use of 
qigong than China, just as it had done with the “four great inventions” of China: paper, gunpowder, the 
printing press and the compass.  
End of utopia 
 
Throughout the 1990’s, a worn regime, devoted primarily to preserving its power 
and to achieving international normality, notably through membership in the World 
Trade Organization, became increasingly distant from its utopian origins. The focus was 
now integration into world capitalism. Money, competition and corruption ruled. The 
new generation of Party leaders, led by Jiang Zemin, were technocrats rather than 
revolutionaries, more interested in economics and hard technology than in the power of 
consciousness to accomplish transformation, be it of society or of the body.   
China’s scientific institutions, through increasing international exchanges, 
embarked on a process of integration with the worldwide scientific community. The 
“Chinese science” of qigong became less of a fascination, especially when scientists 
applied international standards to evaluate its claims. In 1988, members of the China 
Academy of Sciences invited the American Committee for the Scientific Investigation of 
Claims of the Paranormal (CSICOP) to visit China and investigate Extraordinary 
Functions. The committee’s delegation witnessed 15 demonstrations of alleged 
Extraordinary Functions by subjects selected by qigong organizations. None of the 
demonstrations passed the CSICOP’s criteria.  Articles critical of Yan Xin began to 
appear in the press, and Hong Kong newspapers became the forum of a heated anti-
qigong polemic.  
 The media reported an increasing number of cases of qigong quackery and of 
qigong practitioners unable to come out of trance, starving themselves to death while 
fasting, or displaying psychotic behaviour. Psychiatric wards opened special sections for 
qigong-related disorders13. Some alleged qigong techniques, such as Electric Qigong and 
Lightweight Qigong, were exposed as simple tricks bearing no relation to qigong. A growing 
number of researchers, including some within the qigong community, claimed that so-
called ‘external Qi’ was merely psychological suggestion and self-hypnosis.  
In response to these controversies, the government issued a new policy on qigong 
in October 1989, which included licensing qigong masters and taxing qigong organizations. 
Within a few months, over half of qigong masters, unable to obtain licenses, lost their 
jobs, and several qigong organizations and clinics, unable to pay taxes, closed their doors. 
Yan Xin’s popularity began to wane. A ‘force filled lecture’ he gave at the Shanghai 
Municipal Stadium in March 1990, though attended by 23000 persons, was surrounded 
                                                
13 On qigong deviation, see Chen 2003: 77-106.  
by controversy (an audience member died during the lecture) and widely regarded as a 
failure. Anticipating political criticism, General Zhang Zhenhuan, the highest official in 
the qigong community, advised Yan Xin to leave China for the United States and promote 
qigong in the West.  
Through a policy of ‘no criticism, no promotion, no debate’, the government 
enforced a precarious truce between advocates and opponents of qigong. But with the 
death in March 1994 of General Zhang Zhenhuan, who had been an influencial 
promoter of qigong among the country’s leaders, the adversaries of qigong seized the 
chance to lead a vigorous anti-qigong campaign. Throughout 1995, former qigong master 
Sima Nan waged a heated polemic against ‘pseudo-qigong’ in a series of television and 
radio interviews, newspaper articles, and a controversial book entitled The Inside Story on 
Miraculous Qigong 14. Anti-qigong articles appeared in the press all through 1995. The 
chairman of the China Academy of Sciences and several other influential Chinese 
scientists spoke or wrote against qigong, calling it pseudo-science, superstition, quackery, 
and a dangerous cult similar to the Aum Shinrikyo sect of Japan. 
Qigong itself became increasingly commercialized, as masters and semi-official 
sponsoring organizations saw the mass profits that could be made from turning qigong 
into a product. Qigong groups became better organized, as masters competed for the 
allegiance of the millions of practitioners willing to pay to attend force-filled lectures, 
training workshops, healing clinics, and to buy qigong books, tapes, videos and 
paraphrenelia. The young master Zhang Hongbao, for example, attempted to regroup 
qigong adepts under the umbrella of a vast commercial organization owning qigong 
universities, qigong hospitals, qigong cadre training institutes, and qigong business 
enterprises. His Zhonggong method condensed qigong techniques into eight ascending 
levels. As early as the second level, adepts were integrated into the organization’s 
nationwide qigong training sales system. In 1994, Zhonggong claimed 30 million adepts 
and had become the largest mass organization in China outside the Communist Party15. 
By the mid 1990’s, the government began to discreetly limit the activities of the 
movement. Zhang Hongbao disappeared around that time16.  
                                                
14 Sima 1995.  
15 The name Zhonggong is a homophone of the abbreviated name of the Chinese Communist Party, 
Zhonggong. 
16 He reappeared in the summer of 2000, seeking political asylum on the American Pacific island of 
Guam. 
  Many qigong groups revealed, in their structure, their ideology and practises, an 
affinity with the heterodox sects of the pre-communist era17. Increasingly, qigong was 
being propagated by structured organizations that used the teaching and practise of body 
cultivation to recruit adepts and disseminate a specific ideology. This ideology, which 
varied from one group to another, typically included an ideal of universal salvation which 
integrated elements of magical thought, millenarian eschatology, scientism, and romantic 
nationalism around the charismatic figure of the qigong Grandmaster18. It was inevitable 
that qigong transmission would lead to organized groups, as the circulation of body 
cultivation techniques, qi, healing, and money formed bonds between masters and 
practitioners that needed to be managed and formalized. 
The attempt, which had been encouraged by the government, to enlist Chinese 
body cultivation into the service of socialist construction and then of a new Chinese-led 
scientific revolution, had ended up as a failure. Qigong had led to the emergence of a 
sectarian milieu, of organizations independent from the state whose structure, ideology 
and practises weaved an alternative culture in the interstices of official structures. In 
1996, the government launched a campaign to ‘rectify’ qigong associations, removing 
official recognition from groups that had strayed too far from official Marxism. A large 
number of qigong masters settled in other countries, opening new markets for qigong’s 
development abroad. In China, qigong circles were divided and disoriented by the 
criticism and increased control. But one group, Falungong, though a target of this purge, 
continued to expand, even as its master Li Hongzhi fled to the United States in 1996.  
 
Apocalyptic qigong  
 
 While public opinion turned against the greed and quackery of many masters, Li 
Hongzhi condemned the commercialisation of qigong. Falungong – the qigong of the 
Dharma Wheel -- linked the body cultivation of qigong to a moralistic, messianic and 
apocalyptic doctrine. This strategy allowed the method to spread rapidly, attracting 
                                                
17 On qigong and the Chinese sectarian tradition, see Ownby 2002 and Palmer 2003b. The term “sect” 
is here used in a sociological sense in the Chinese context, in reference to voluntary popular groups 
with charismatic leaders which are distinct from the state-recognized institutional religions and from 
traditional cults based on lineage, clan, village, social status, or profession. For a detailed history of 
Chinese sectarianism, see Seiwert 2003. On breath circulation techniques in “White Lotus” groups, see 
Overmyer 1976: 188-191; Naquin 1976: 26-32 and 1985. On the political use of such labels as “White 
Lotus”, see ter Haar 1992. On sectarianism during the Republican period, see Perry 1980: 152-203 and 
Duara 1995: 96-109. On sectarianism in Taiwan, see Jordan and Overmyer 1986. On the resurgence of 
sects in rural China, see Munro 1989.  
18 For an analysis of these themes, see Palmer 2003a: 90-96.  
millions of qigong adepts, retired people and marginalized intellectuals. Indeed, by the mid 
1990’s, the danwei system of life-long security, which had structured the lives of urban 
Chinese for almost fifty years, was beginning to unravel under market-oriented reforms 
and an ever-deeper corruption. This was not a time for flights of free subjectivity in an 
over-structured environment, like the qigong of the 1980’s, but for finding certainty in a 
disintegrating social world. Exploiting nostalgia for the altruism of the Maoist days, 
Falungong organized a movement of resistance against the growing social, moral and 
spiritual decadence19. Around 1994, Li Hongzhi began to teach that the purpose of body 
cultivation was not good health, but spiritual salvation: a goal that must pass through the 
physical and social suffering that can result from practicing the fundamental virtues of 
truth, compassion and forbearance. Falling ill, or suffering from the abuse of colleagues, 
bosses, or the police, become salutary trials through which the practitioner could 
reimburse his karmic debts. Falungong no longer presented itself as a qigong method but 
as the Great Law or Dharma (Fa) of the universe, a doctrine with its own sacred 
scripture, Zhuan Falun (“Turning the Dharma-Wheel”)20 which transcends all forms of 
material organization, superior to all philosophies, laws, teachings, religions, and body 
cultivation methods in the history of humanity, and offering the only path of salvation 
from the apocalyptic end of the kalpa or universal cycle, in which the universe is 
destroyed21.  
 There is no training of the breath in Falungong gymnastics and meditation. Li 
Hongzhi acknowledges the existence of qi, but claims that it is a lower and impure form 
of energy which the Falungong disciple should not pursue. Where qigong involved 
opening the body to the cosmos -- “collecting qi” from trees, the sun, and the moon, 
sending and receiving qi between practitioners, dabbling in all types of techniques, 
symbols, and concepts -- the Falungong practitioner must close his body to the lower 
influences of the world. He should not practice other techniques, nor read other qigong or 
religious books, nor engage in healing by emission of external qi – practices which all lead 
to possession by demons lurking in other methods, books, and bodies. According to Li 
Hongzhi, the body contains two types of matter, the demonic “black matter” which is an 
accumulation of bad karma for sins committed in past and present lives, and the “white 
matter” of virtue, which increases with good deeds and through the practice of 
Falungong. When someone is rude, dishonest, or violent to another, he unwittingly gives 
                                                
19 For a sociological analysis of Falungong, see Madsen 2000.  
20 For an online edition of Zhuan Falun, see the Falungong website: www.falundafa.org 
21 For an analysis of Li Hongzhi’s doctrine, see Palmer 2001.  
his white matter to the victim and absorbs his black matter. All the more so if a 
Falungong practitioner is verbally or physically abused while defending the Fa. In order 
to eliminate the karmic black matter and attain salvation, the disciple should attach 
himself exclusively to the Great Fa – a connection which is embodied by the swirling 
inverted Buddhist swastika which Li Hongzhi telepathically implants into the bellies of 
each of his followers, and by the countless invisible Fa-bodies with which he protects the 
sincere practitioner. In Falungong, then, the body is closed and protected from a 
demonic outside world; becomes the site of a moral struggle between right and wrong; 
and is viscerally attached to the master and his Fa through the implanted swastika and 
Fa-bodies. The disciple becomes a “Fa-particle” in the great body of the Fa.  Falungong 
became a new social body, in which the practitioners’ bodies were the theatres of both 
personal struggle and of the apocalyptic battle between the demonic old world and the 
righteous Fa22.  
The moral rigour, the active missionizing, and the strict discipline of Falungong’s 
organization allowed it to recruit successfully in all sectors of society, attracting tens of 
millions of adepts, particularly among retired people. In spite of its illegal status and its 
occultist philosophy clearly at odds with the official ideology, Falungong propagated 
itself openly and with impunity. Only a handful of journalists and scientists dared to 
criticize the group in the press, stressing its ‘superstitious’ character and reporting on 
cases of adepts who had become seriously ill or even allegedly died due to following Li 
Hongzhi’s teaching to refuse medical treatment.  
At the same time as he moved his base to the United States, Li Hongzhi 
explained that salvation could only be attained through the public defence of Falungong, 
without fearing the consequences of such action. The network of practice site 
supervisors was activated to mobilize the practitioners to react against any criticism 
through letter-writing campaigns, sit-ins, and peaceful protests directed at media and 
government offices. The resistance, anchored in public displays of bodies in movement, 
was spectacular. Thousands of disciplined adepts appeared at strategic times and places, 
and managed to obtain apologies, rectifications, and even, in the case of the Beijing TV 
station, the firing of a critical journalist. Such actions had never been seen in Communist 
China: an organized group23 with tens of millions of potential militants from all social 
strata and geographic areas, which did not hesitate to display its power on the public 
                                                
22 For a study of Li Hongzhi’s body, see Penny 2002.  
23 Note that Li Hongzhi and Falungong practitioners emphatically deny the existence of a Falungong 
organization. See Tong 2002.  
square and intimidate the media which, after all, are mouthpieces of the Party. In the 
beginning, the authorities were hesitant to intervene. A large number of CCP members 
were Falun Gong adepts or sympathisers. Some leaders considered Falungong’s daily 
gymnastics as a harmless and economical way to keep the masses of Chinese seniors 
occupied. Others feared the true influence of Falungong and the risk of alienating Li 
Hongzhi’s tens of millions of disciples.  
 Following the arrest of two leaders of a Falungong protest against a Tianjin 
magazine, however, over ten thousand adepts silently surrounded Zhongnanhai, the 
nerve centre of the Party’s power, on 25 April 1999. Perceived as a dangerous 
provocation by President Jiang Zemin, this demonstration triggered the deployment of 
the Party’s classic repressive apparatus, through a systematic campaign launched on 22 
July 1999, which continues to this day: propaganda, mobilization of official 
organizations, work camps, psychiatric internment, torture, etc. Most Falungong 
practitioners immediately gave up the practice and were spared from negative 
consequences. But a minority of adepts remained loyal to Falungong and, in a spirit of 
martyrdom, continued to protest the repression, ready to sacrifice their bodies to display 
the power of Li Hongzhi’s Great Fa. Most of the other large qigong organizations were 
discreetly dismantled by the government. Only Falungong has survived as an 
underground resistance movement that continues to flout government repression, under 
the eye of the international media24.  
 With the master’s exile and the international media coverage of the crackdown, 
Falungong became a U.S.-based world movement that presented itself as the innocent 
victim of a totalitarian genocide25. Through the systematic use of protests, the media, 
cyberspace, the hijacking of Chinese TV signals, and the legal systems of Western 
countries, Falungong strove to systematically embarrass Party leaders on the world stage 
and to attract international condemnation of the repression. Today, the Communist Party 
and Falungong continue to wage a propaganda war before world public opinion – a war 
that draws heavily on gory images of mutilated bodies26. Official Chinese sources show 
images of alleged Falungong practitioners who, for instance, set themselves on fire or cut 
open their bellies to pull out the rotating swastika planted by the master27. Falungong 
                                                
24 On Falungong as a popular protest movement, see Perry 2001.  
25 For lack of space this chapter does not discuss the overseas expansion of Falungong. For studies of 
Falungong practice in North America, see Palmer, Susan 2003 and Porter 2003.  
26 On the styles of Chinese government and Falungong propaganda, see Powers & Lee 2002.  
27 See for example http://english.eastday.com/epublish/gb/paper9/18/class000900002/hwz21198.htm 
(accessed on 18 Feb. 2004) 
literature and websites provide photographic documentation of the scarred and burnt 
body parts of tortured practitioners28.  
 The CCP is now committed to the complete eradication of Falungong. Although 
non-violence characterizes Falungong militancy, its symbolic power is all the more 
disruptive: the Zhongnanhai demonstration, where thousands of adepts quietly 
surrounded the heart of the Party for a whole day, evokes images of a siege or of 
strangling. Through this act, Falungong projected the image of a powerful organization, 
capable of mobilizing the masses, and which was not afraid of the Party. Until today, 
political power in China is only partially exercised through a machinery of control, and 
more so through the subjective perception of its power and the fear of falling into 
trouble. The reinforcement of such impressions through propaganda and the visible 
manifestation of power is thus crucially important. The Zhongnanhai demonstration 
threatened to shatter the fear of the people and to transfer symbolic power onto 
Falungong. Thus, a Chinese practitioner who converted to Falungong after the 
demonstration told me, in a menacing tone: “if the Party dares to act against Falungong, 
Li Hongzhi will show his power”. Indeed, between 1998 and 1999, each Falungong 
demonstration seemed to bring about an increase in the number of practitioners.  
 The history of Chinese sectarianism shows that, if the majority of such groups 
have not become involved in politics, some have, at certain points in their development, 
turned into rebel organizations. In like manner, Falungong evolved from a qigong method 
geared to health and healing, to become in 1994 a doctrine of salvation based on a sacred 
book, and then, beginning in 1996, the path to salvation included the “defense of the Fa” 
through an activism that would necessarily be interpreted in China as political behaviour 
aiming to confront and weaken the political order. In the repression campaign and in 
Falungong’s responses, the historical scenario of the sect rebelling against the state plays 
itself out once more, each side entrenching itself in its predetermined role and provoking 
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29 For further analyses of Falungong, see the special issue of Nova Religio (vol. 6, no. 2, 2003) on 
Falungong, edited by Catherine Wessinger. See also Leung 2002.  
The Falungong conflict can be understood in terms of classical Chinese notions 
of the body and of the state. The Chinese state perceives itself as a single body englobing 
and organizing the entire society. The centre of the social body is the body of the 
emperor, whose power comes from its virtue derived from heaven, and which flows to 
the people, uniting their hearts through the ritual ordering of their bodies. This is the 
enduring inner source of political power, to which the external, military force of the state 
is but an auxiliary, used to suppress foreign bodies. Falungong challenged the state’s 
authority and legitimacy on four counts: (1) it attacked the moral corruption and lack of 
virtue of the Party’s leaders and presented an alternative source of moral authority in the 
body of Li Hongzhi and his Fa, thus touching at the very core of political legitimacy. (2) 
Around the master’s moral authority, and against the corruption of society, Falungong 
formed a new social body, a foreign organism which challenged the unitary nature of the 
state. (3) The public protests and displays of Falungong – notably the Zhongnanhai 
incident and other demonstrations before and after it, disrupted the state’s ritual ordering 
of space and bodies and undermined its symbolic power; (4) The deployment of a 
massive material apparatus of state propaganda and repression, and its inability to crush 
the bodies of practitioners, revealed the inner weakness of a political formation that, 
unable to base itself on a higher moral ground, could only resort to the tried and tested 
methods of Leninist political campaigns.  
 This chapter began with an overview of traditional Chinese notions of body 
cultivation, and then showed how body cultivation evolved in the Peoples’ Republic of 
China through the modern qigong movement. In the 1950’s and early 60’s, body 
cultivation was reformulated and institutionalized as part of the Communist state’s 
project of developing the health of the masses and of extracting and transforming all 
useful elements of traditional culture in the service of building the New China. During 
the Cultural revolution, body cultivation was banned but the mass qigong model, 
pioneered by Guo Lin, was born. In the 1980’s qigong vehicled a shift from social utopia 
to the individual body, and became a pathway to find inner freedom and alternative 
worlds, often expressed in a religious idiom and symbolism,  within the interstices of the 
state. Though still promoted and monitored by the state, qigong in this period increasingly 
escaped state control and became the locus for alternative networks of masters and 
practitioners. In the 1990’s, these networks gave birth to autonomous social bodies in the 
form of organized commercial and/or sectarian groups, one of which, Falungong, 
focalized resistance to the state and to the destructuring and corruption of a rapidly-
changing society. Each phase of Chinese socialist modernity – from its period of utopian 
state-construction to its post-revolutionary and market-driven phases --  witnessed the 
appearance of new mutations of the Chinese tradition of body cultivation and, through 
them, different uses of religious symbols and forms of social organization, and a different 
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